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Abstract
Researchers and policymakers advocate teaching children about digital privacy, but privacy literacy has not been theorized
for children. Drawing on interviews with 30 families, including 40 children, we analyze children’s perspectives on password
management in three contexts—family life, friendship, and education—and develop a new approach to privacy literacy
grounded in Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework. Contextual integrity equates privacy with appropriate flows
of information, and we show how children’s perceptions of the appropriateness of disclosing a password varied across
contexts. We explain why privacy literacy should focus on norms rather than rules and discuss how adults can use learning
moments to strengthen children’s privacy literacy. We argue that equipping children to make privacy-related decisions
serves them better than instructing them to follow privacy-related rules.
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1. Introduction
Researchers and policymakers advocate integrating pri-
vacy into information literacy efforts to help children
understand the privacy implications of digital activi-
ties (Culver & Grizzle, 2017; Stoilova, Nandagiri, &
Livingstone, 2019). However, current approaches to pri-
vacy literacy focus too narrowly on privacy as control
(Hagendorff, 2018) and have not been theorized for chil-
dren. By interpreting children’s perspectives on pass-
word management through the contextual integrity (CI)
framework (Nissenbaum, 2010, 2019), we ground pri-
vacy literacy in a well-established privacy theory and con-
nect it to children’s experiences of privacy.
Media and communication studies treats privacy lit-
eracy as knowledge to be learned (Bartsch & Dienlin,
2016; Baruh, Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017; Park, 2013;
Park & Jang, 2014; Trepte et al., 2015), while library
and information studies regards privacy literacy as a pro-
cess of critical thinking (Rotman, 2009; Wissinger, 2017).
Instead, we draw on literacy as a social practice (Scribner
&Cole, 1981) and privacy as the appropriate flowof infor-
mation (Nissenbaum, 2010, 2019) to articulate privacy
literacy as the practice of enacting appropriate informa-
tion flows within sociotechnical systems. In this article,
we interpret children’s perspectives on password man-
agement in three contexts—family life, friendship, and
education—through the CI framework and explain why
privacy literacy should attend to norms rather than rules.
We also discuss how adults can use learning moments to
help strengthen children’s privacy literacy.
2. Related Work
To lay the groundwork for our approach to privacy lit-
eracy, we identify the limitations of current conceptu-
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alizations of privacy literacy. We then review how the
CI framework treats privacy, explaining why it holds
promise for privacy literacy.We subsequently situate our
approach to privacy literacy within existing research on
children’s digital privacy.
2.1. Privacy Literacy
Existing conceptions of privacy literacy focus on the
individual dimension of privacy. The knowledge-based
approach to privacy literacy distinguishes between fac-
tual/declarative knowledge (e.g., knowing that apps col-
lect data) and procedural knowledge (e.g., knowing how
to limit this data collection; Trepte et al., 2015). Surveys
operationalize factual/declarative knowledge through
true/false or yes/no questions about data collection
and management practices, and procedural knowledge
through self-report questions about familiarity or com-
fort with tasks like adjusting privacy settings or turning
off location tracking (Bartsch &Dienlin, 2016; Park, 2013;
Park & Jang, 2014). However, given that most American
adults report low levels of privacy knowledge (Auxier
et al., 2019), relying on knowledge alone may not be a
practical way to help people protect their privacy. And
as technologies and interfaces change, facts and proce-
dures quickly grow obsolete, requiring constant updates
to privacy knowledge.
The process-based approach to privacy literacy
includes five components: understanding contexts of
information disclosure, recognizing where information
is shared, realizing the implications of disclosing private
information, evaluating potential privacy threats, and
deciding what to disclose (Rotman, 2009). Here, privacy
literacy is a form of critical thinking (Wissinger, 2017).
While this approach acknowledges the dynamic nature
of privacy management, it focuses narrowly on the dis-
closure of private information. A conception of privacy
literacy grounded more broadly in the flow of informa-
tion would equip people to evaluate a wider field of pri-
vacy concerns (Hagendorff, 2018).
To expand privacy literacy beyond individual deci-
sions about disclosing information, we find Scribner and
Cole’s (1981) account of literacy as a social practice a
useful starting point. They argue literacy “is not simply
knowing how to read and write…but applying this knowl-
edge for specific purposes in specific contexts of use”
(Scribner & Cole, 1981, p. 236). Literacy involves devel-
oping particular skills and understanding when, why, and
how to enact those skills. This implicates more than indi-
vidual abilities, as social contexts, cultural norms, expert
authorities, and institutional policies all shape the prac-
tice of literacy.
2.2. Privacy as Contextual Integrity
Technology and media scholar Helen Nissenbaum
(2010, 2019) devised the CI framework to explain how
sociotechnical systems threaten privacy. CI does not
equate privacy with secrecy or control but with the
appropriate flow of information. That is, privacy is about
ensuring that information travels in socially acceptable
ways. For example, imagine two friends, where Friend 1
has a love interest but declines to tell Friend 2 who it is.
Friend 2 demands that Friend 1 disclose the love inter-
est’s name or the friendship is over. Friend 1 reluctantly
reveals the name. A CI analysis explains why this violates
Friend 1’s privacy.
CI posits that information flows appropriately when
the flow aligns with the norms of a particular context.
To conduct a CI analysis, one must first identify whether
an information flow aligns with contextual informational
norms. They must then evaluate the flow against the
broader ethical and moral commitments of society to
determine whether any norm violations rise to the level
of unacceptability. Defining the norms that govern a spe-
cific information flow requires identifying five parame-
ters: the type of information involved, the information
subject (i.e., to whom the information belongs or refers),
the sender, the recipient, and the transmission princi-
ples (i.e., constraints imposed on the information flow).
Table 1 identifies parameters for the example informa-
tion flow.
This information flow occurs in the context of friend-
ship, where people typically share freely within the
bounds of companionship. While a transmission princi-
ple of mutuality usually circumscribes the friendship con-
text, the example flow involved coercion, where Friend 2
compelled Friend 1’s disclosure by threatening the rela-
tionship’s existence. The change in transmission princi-
ples goes against contextual norms. But pronouncing this
a privacy violation requires evaluating the flow against
societal values. Coercion is not antithetical in the context
of friendship; if Friend 1 withheld the location of some-
one in imminent danger, Friend 2 could justifiably impel
disclosure. But forcing Friend 1 to reveal a love inter-
est’s name rattles the trust that binds friendships. Social
Table 1. Parameters of information flow.
Parameter Example Information Flow
Information type Love interest’s name
Information subject Friend 1
Sender Friend 1
Recipient Friend 2
Transmission principle Coercion
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fabric would fray if friendships resembled depositions.
Consequently, by altering the transmission principle of
the information flow, Friend 2 undermined its contex-
tual integrity and violated Friend 1’s privacy. The trans-
mission principle “may be the most distinguishing ele-
ment of the framework of contextual integrity; although
what it denotes is plain to see, it usually goes unnoticed”
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 145). No definitive list links spe-
cific transmission principles with contexts; instead, the
“possibilities for constraints that may serve as [transmis-
sion principles] are endless” (Nissenbaum, 2019, p. 230).
While primarily intended to inform the design and
regulation of technologies, CI could be a useful founda-
tion for privacy-related educational efforts. CI does not
dictate how information should flow; it offers a method
for making privacy-related decisions. CI could help chil-
dren identify information flows, recognize the contextual
norms that govern flows, and evaluate whether flows
are appropriate. This approach would equip rather than
instruct children; it would help them learn how to man-
age privacy rather than teach them what to do to pro-
tect privacy.
2.3. Children and Digital Privacy
Research about children’s digital privacy typically focuses
on older children and interpersonal dimensions of pri-
vacy (Stoilova et al., 2019). Many children over age
10 report knowing how to change social media privacy
settings (Livingstone, Mascheroni, Ólafsson, & Haddon,
2014) but demonstrate less understanding of how data
flows implicate privacy (Bowler, Acker, Jeng, & Chi, 2017;
Selwyn & Pangrazio, 2018). Questions of children’s pri-
vacy vis-à-vis commercial and institutional data practices
remain understudied (Stoilova et al., 2019), though one
experimental study found that watching a video about
online data practices increased children’s (knowledge-
based) privacy literacy related to the commercial use of
data (Desimpelaere, Hudders, & Van de Sompel, 2020).
Children receive little privacy-related instruction, with
educators uncertain aboutwhat it should entail (Culver&
Grizzle, 2017) or believing younger children do not need
it (Kumar, Chetty, Clegg, & Vitak, 2019).
Nevertheless, children recognize aspects of how
online interactions affect privacy (Kumar et al., 2017).
Families draw on several non-school sources of knowl-
edge, including informal learning experiences, advice
from relatives and friends, and information from expert
sources, to navigate privacy online (Subramaniam,
Kumar, Morehouse, Liao, & Vitak, 2019). Children can
develop data and privacy literacy through participa-
tion in online communities (Hautea, Dasgupta, & Hill,
2017) or design workshops (Selwyn & Pangrazio, 2018).
Research recommends that privacy education efforts
clearly relate to children’s everyday lives (rather than
present contrived or irrelevant scenarios) and give chil-
dren opportunities to practice decision-making (Kumar
et al., 2018; Raynes-Goldie & Allen, 2014). Children, like
adults, move through a variety of social contexts, but
existing approaches to privacy literacy do not explore
how contextual norms affect privacy. To address this, we
contribute a new conception of privacy literacy based on
an analysis of children’s passwordmanagement practices
in three contexts—family life, friendship, and education.
3. Methods
We draw on interviews we conducted with families as
part of two projects about privacy, security, and every-
day digital technology use. One project, which exam-
ined how children conceptualize privacy and security
online, involved 18 families (23 parents and 26 chil-
dren ages 5–11; Kumar et al., 2017). The second project,
which focused on how low-income families navigate dig-
ital privacy and security concerns, included 52 families
(54 adults and 23 children, ranging from toddlers to adult
age; Subramaniam et al., 2019). We did not collect age
or other demographic information from participants in
the second project, though they often volunteered such
information during the interviews. We made this deci-
sion because low-income individuals may have less trust
in researchers, and given the sensitive nature of our inter-
view questions, we wanted to avoid making participants
uncomfortable by asking about their demographics. For
more information about this decision, see Vitak, Liao,
Subramaniam, and Kumar (2018).
In both projects, we asked children and parents
about children’s experiences with digital devices, inquir-
ing further if they mentioned privacy, security, or related
concepts (e.g., secrecy). In the first project, we also
played a game with children where we presented hypo-
thetical scenarios (e.g., a sibling looking at the screen
while a child plays on a tablet) and asked how theywould
recommend a child handle the situation. Interviews for
both projects occurred across the U.S. state of Maryland
between December 2016 and June 2017. We inter-
viewed each family once. In the second project, some
families included relatives such as grandparents. We use
the term parent in this article to refer to a child’s primary
caregiver, which can encompass various kinship or other
relations. When reporting participant quotes, we label
participants from the first project with a letter and those
from the second with a number.
Both research teams developed codebooks based on
their research goals and revised them as they coded tran-
scripts (King, 2014). For this article, we selected codes
related to privacy and security for further analysis. While
reviewing the interview excerpts, we observed that
children’s responses to questions about privacy often
echoed this 10-year-old boy’s: “Just don’t tell your pass-
word and username or any…private things” (Family W).
This rule linking privacy to the secrecy of a password per-
meated the interviews, with children attributing it to par-
ents and teachers alike.
Since children connected passwords with privacy, we
decided to focus on information flows related to pass-
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wordmanagement.We identified relevant excerpts from
interviews with 30 families, including 40 children. This
encompassed all 18 of the families from the first project
and 12 families from the second project (14 adults and
14 children). To analyze the data, we first drew dia-
grams depicting the information flows involving pass-
words. This attuned us to the various practices involved
in password management (e.g., knowing, remember-
ing, forgetting, discerning, and disclosing passwords)
and to the contexts in which children managed pass-
words. Following CI, we then clustered excerpts by prac-
tice and context, identified the parameters of infor-
mation flows, and parsed participants’ determinations
of appropriateness.
4. Findings
Children’s password management practices spanned
three contexts: family life, friendship, and education.
Children encountered passwordswhile accessing devices
(e.g., computer, Chromebook, tablet, smartphone) and
accounts (e.g., games, socialmedia, school).We organize
the findings by context and interpret children’s perspec-
tives surrounding a specific information flow—the disclo-
sure of passwords—through CI, highlighting connections
to privacy literacy.
4.1. Family Life Context: Knowing, Forgetting, and
Discerning Passwords
The family life context encompassed password practices
among parents, children, and siblings. In some cases,
passwords did not flow fromparents to children, suggest-
ing parents did not regard children as appropriate recip-
ients of passwords. A 7-year-old surmised his mother
refused to disclose a password so he and his siblings
“don’t get into her computer when she’s not looking”;
his 9-year-old brother added that “she doesn’t really
want us playing on the computer all the time” (Family C).
A 6-year-old said she tried to get hermother to reveal her
phone’s passcode “sowhen she’s like, in the shower, I can
get onto it” (Family K). A 7-year-old said she was going to
try and figure out her mother’s Kindle password and her
mother replied, “Oh please don’t, you’ll lock both of us
out if you do that” (Family D).
Other children said parents told them passwords on
the condition that they not tell others. Two adults chided
children for disclosing passwords during the interview.
One told her 8-year-old grandson, “You don’t tell your
passwords ever, to any of those, unless you tell meemaw
[colloquial term for grandmother]. I’m the only one
that’s supposed to know other than your teacher, okay?”
(Family 12). In CI terms, this caregiver suggested a trans-
mission principle of notice—telling the grandparent—
before reverting to one of confidentiality—that only a
(grand)parent or teacher should know a password.
Another parent, whose 5-year-old son disclosed his
family’s iPad password to the interviewer, said she had
likened passwords to door keys to explain to her son
why “a password isn’t something that you can share with
everybody….We just don’t leave keys lying around for
the door…[because] anyone can find them and break
in.” She suggested that circumstantial factors could have
made him feel comfortable disclosing the password dur-
ing the interview: “Maybe he really trusts you [the inter-
viewer]…because you’re in our house….Maybe, some-
body on the street, he may not do it” (Family S). The boy
may have regarded the interaction as governed by the
transmission principle of mutuality, treating the inter-
viewer as a friend whom he could trust with the pass-
word, or of requirement, treating the interviewer as an
authority figure whose presence in his home demanded
knowledge of the password.
Passwords did not flow reciprocally between parents
and children; while parents could withhold passwords
from children, they often required children to disclose
any passwords they managed to parents. As one 8-year-
old boy explained, “My mom knows my password, and
that’s the first person I need to tell because she always
needs to know my password” (Family H). Some chil-
dren expressed interest in keeping their parents out of
their devices. A 7-year-old said she would not want her
mother to know her tablet’s password “because I don’t
want my mom getting on my iPad and seeing what her
future birthday presents [are]” (Family D).
Children’s recollections also underscored parents’
important role in helping children manage passwords.
Some children needed assistance remembering pass-
words; one 8-year-old girl said, “My mom usually makes
a password forme and puts it on a piece of paper so I can
remember it, and it’s usually, like, in the coupon box”
(Family G). Other families suffered the consequences of
children’s forgetfulness. A 10-year-old wanted a pass-
word for her iPad because “I didn’t like it when a
lot of people just went on my iPad” (Family Y). She
“made a passcode when [my parents] weren’t around
and then I forgot it and we had to, like, back up the
whole iPad and re-download a bunch of apps and stuff.”
Another parent said her 6-year-old daughter “creates
email addresses and passwords like it’s nothing. She
probably has a million of them. I’ll find papers around
the house that have…all these different characters and
letters” (Family 4). This highlights that privacy literacy
efforts must also consider children’s evolving develop-
mental capacities.
Password flows also varied between siblings. An 11-
year-old said she told her 8-year-old sister her email
password (Family V). Others deduced siblings’ passwords
or vice-versa. One 9-year-old “figured out my brother’s
password on his phone and I didn’t tell him for two
days.” He revealed his deed on the third day after his
brother “said ‘if you figure out the password then I’ll
let you play on it.”’ He guessed the password by using
the numbers in his brother’s phone number (Family 7).
An 11-year-old said he changed his phone’s password
from four to six digits after his 8-year-old brother fig-
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ured it out. During the interview, the younger boy said
he overheard his brother tell their mother to “double the
thing,” and disclosed what he thought the new password
was. “Now I have to change it again,” the older brother
replied (Family B). Indeed, while the targeted siblingmay
feel annoyed or concerned that the perpetrating sibling
might mess up their device or account, such experiences
may also be necessary for children to learn privacy norms
(Wolfe & Laufer, 1975).
Families understandably differed in their beliefs
aboutwho constituted an appropriate recipient of a pass-
word. These decisions were influenced in part by chil-
dren’s abilities and dispositions relating to, for instance,
remembering a password or limiting their time spent
playing computer games. Password management also
involved play and transgression, for example, noncha-
lantly creating accounts or cleverly deducing a sibling’s
password. These are typical aspects of child behavior.
While adults may want to correct these seemingly neg-
ative actions, we should also consider how these actions
help children develop richer, more nuanced understand-
ings of privacy.
4.2. Friendship Context: Trust, or Lack of it
Children were usually told not to disclose passwords to
others, with secrecy or confidentiality as the underly-
ing transmission principle. Discussions about password
sharing among friends or generic ‘other people’ invoked
other transmission principles. For example, a 7-year-
old said she disclosed her iPad password to a neigh-
bor, whom she called a “grownup friend…because she
needed [the password],” though she didn’t remem-
ber why (Family F). Here, the transmission principle of
requirement superseded that of confidentiality. An 11-
year-old said he felt comfortable sharing game pass-
words with friends if doing so could help him in the
game, invoking the transmission principle of exchange—
each party benefits from the information flow (Family B).
When asked whether a child should share an account
password with a friend, one 10-year-old girl said it
depended on the friend:
If it’s someone that you don’t know very well or that
you aren’t really close to, then I wouldn’t do it. But,
like, sometimes if me and my friends are working
together and she wants to look something up on my
Chromebook and [she’s] my really close friend who
I trust, I just tell her my password and she tells me
her password and like….I know that she’s not going to
tell anyone else because I trust her. (Family Y)
This girl invoked the transmission principle of mutuality,
evaluating the appropriateness of the flow in part based
on whether she trusted the recipient. Some participants
said children should only disclose passwords to parents,
while others mentioned that children may not want to
reveal passwords to anyone. One 11-year-old called the
disclosure a privacy issue; her 8-year-old sister added,
“Sometimes, you have things that you don’t want to tell
people, even your parents” (Family V), returning to the
transmission principle of secrecy.
Children explained that disclosing a password to a
friend could lead to negative outcomes, such as someone
telling others the password, looking at personal accounts,
or doing something on the device or account that could
get the child in trouble. An 8-year-old boy said that if the
person asking for the password was “a stranger, maybe
they could post something bad [about] our friends and
then our friends wouldn’t like us anymore just because
of them” (Family P).
Indeed, when the conversation turned to disclos-
ing passwords to non-friends, children deemed such
flows inappropriate. Some said they wouldn’t disclose
their passwords because, as one 8-year-old boy put it,
“I don’t like people messing up my games” (Family B).
A 6-year-old said he shouldn’t disclose his Animal Jam
password because “if they steal your phone….They could
do bad stuff on it like, they could tell people what they
didn’t want to actually tell” (Family N). An 8-year-old
girl explained:
I wouldn’t let anyone else use my password because
it’s my password. It’s my personal business, not
theirs….If someone gets my password, maybe they
would use it for something that I didn’t do and I might
get in trouble for something I didn’t do. And I don’t
wanna risk [that]. And I don’t want anyone to know
my personal business. If that password may be con-
nected to any ofmy personal family business or any of
my business, then I don’t want anyone to be looking
into it and finding out any of my own stuff. (Family G)
A critical interpretation could construe these children as
reciting online safety tropes they’ve likely heard before.
But reading their explanations through CI points to ways
of discussing privacy with children beyond online safety.
Children said disclosing passwords to non-friends could
result in privacy violations (someone seeing information
you don’t want them to see), reputational harm (some-
one posting negative content about you), and getting in
trouble (if the person does something bad or inappropri-
ate while using your accounts). However, children also
acknowledged that disclosing passwords with friends
could yield benefits or reinforce intimacy (Marwick &
boyd, 2014).
4.3. Education Context: Challenges to Protecting
Passwords
The education context encompassed password practices
among teachers, students, and classmates. Children said
teachers gave students their passwords, oftenwritten on
a card. An 8-year-old said his teacher kept the cards “for
safekeeping” (Family A). An 8-year-old girl said students
can memorize their passwords but keep their cards in
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their desk in case they forget (Family G). One 6-year-old
called his school password “secret” (Family X), and sev-
eral children said they were not allowed to share school
passwords. However, one 6-year-old said her teacher
allowed her to share her password with a classmate who
lacked her own account (Family C). Here, we see the
transmission principle shift from secrecy, suggesting the
password should not be disclosed at all, to one of con-
sent, where the password can be disclosed if the teacher
permits the student to do so.
In other cases, passwords could be inferred. A 7-year-
old said her initials served as the password for a school
math game,meaning classmates knew each other’s pass-
words (Family Q). Her mother added, “The passcode is
just to [track] their progress though, it’s not like they get
access to anything else,” implying that the password’s
weakness posed little concern. A 10-year-old said his
school’s passwords used students’ birthdays and nobody
had gotten into his account “because I didn’t tell anyone
my birthday” (Family I).
Rules against password sharing did not prevent stu-
dents from trying to discern others’ passwords. A 6-year-
old girl said that when students use index cards to log
into their accounts, “they’re supposed to cover [it with]
their hand…and not look….I type my…passcode in fast
so [classmates] won’t know, but then they still know it
because they peek at it” (Family C). An 11-year-old said
students in his district received six-digit passwords; his
8-year-old brother said students sometimes “type ran-
dom numbers and then get into someone’s account”
(Family B). He suspected that happened to him when
he noticed that his account’s profile image had changed
from a penguin to a bicycle. He said he told his teacher,
“so she told, like, the principal and then they made an
announcement, like, no hacking.” When asked if he had
to change his password, he replied, “No, they don’t like
me to change the passwords.”
Other children said their schools offered options to
change passwords. One eleventh grader said her school
used students’ birthdays as passwords, adding that “you
didn’t have to change it, but it was an option” (Family 13).
She said that while she learned about “safety precau-
tions” in school, this included “nothing about pass-
words.” A 10-year-old boy explained that at the begin-
ning of the school year, students have the option of
changing their passwords; “right before, we’ll do a video
that’s [about] how tomake a good password” (FamilyW).
Some children did not consider information flows
that involved others accessing their school materials
problematic. An 8-year-old justified disclosing her school
password to an interviewer because “you don’t really
get to any of our private information by a Chromebook”
(Family G). A 7-year-old expressed little worry about
others looking on his school computer because “every-
body in my class has the same [information on their
Chromebooks]” (Family C). While the presence of plat-
forms like Google in classrooms has rightly raised pri-
vacy concerns (Kumar et al., 2019), these children did
not seem to share such concerns. Considering the edu-
cation context from a child’s viewpoint may help explain
why. Children are required to go to school, follow the
schedules set out for them, complete the tasks assigned
to them, and submit their work for evaluation. Younger
children in particular experience little autonomyover the
information on their Chromebooks, so they may find it
appropriate for that information to flow to others, even
if it sits behind a password.
5. Discussion
Based on our analysis of children’s perspectives of
password management practices in three contexts, we
explain why strengthening children’s privacy literacy
requires focusing on norms rather than rules. One way
adults can strengthen children’s privacy literacy is by tak-
ing advantage of learning moments to discuss privacy
norms with children.
5.1. From Rules to Norms
While rules and norms shape behavior, rules “tend to
be explicit and emanate from authoritative sources,”
whereas norms emerge, vary, and shift more flexibly
than rules (Nissenbaum, 2019, p. 227). CI’s parameters
of information flows—subject, sender, receiver, informa-
tion type, and transmission principle—provide a rich set
of variables for dissecting norms, while rules flatten infor-
mation flows to one or two parameters, obscuring oth-
ers. Rules like ‘don’t tell anyone your password’ ascribe
secrecy to the password. Secrets refer to information
that is hidden, typically because it could reflect nega-
tively on someone. Passwords are not secrets in this
sense; they require protection not because of what they
mean but because of what they do—control access. In CI
terms, secrecy equals the stoppage of information flows,
but children did not experience passwords as secret.
A more fitting transmission principle is confidential-
ity, which “focuses on relationships” and “involves trust-
ing others to refrain from revealing personal informa-
tion to unauthorized individuals” (Richards & Solove,
2007, p. 125). Rules like ‘don’t tell anyone except a par-
ent or teacher your password’ imply confidentiality with
their reference to those who typically hold the position
of trusted adult in children’s lives. Children’s responses
surfaced additional transmission principles that govern
information flows involving passwords, including require-
ment (disclosing a password because someone needs it),
exchange (disclosing because you’ll receive something in
return) and mutuality (disclosing as a form of relational
intimacy).
These principles implicate trust, raising questions
like, do you trust this person needs the password?Do you
trust that disclosing a password will yield the promised
benefit? Do you trust that your friendwon’tmess up your
account? While children may implicitly consider these
questionswhendecidingwhether to disclose a password,
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efforts to strengthen children’s privacy literacy should
make this questioning explicit. Rather than tell children
what is or is not private, educational efforts should help
children determine when information should or should
not flow in a particular situation.
We do not suggest abandoning rules; indeed, their
clarity and simplicity can scaffold learning and skill devel-
opment, especially for younger children. But we propose
that adults connect rules to norms and discuss rules
in terms of contextually appropriate information flows.
The rule ‘don’t tell anyone your password’ becomes
‘only disclose your password to someone you trust.’ For
younger children, rules can define trusted recipients,
such as parents, close friends, or teachers until chil-
dren recognize how to evaluate trust. As children grow,
rules evolve.
CI gives adults and children a vocabulary to discuss
the positive and negative implications of information
flow. For instance, a few children expressed comfort
telling a close friend a password. In CI terms, this flow
could be appropriate because it supports close relations
between peers, an important societal priority. As chil-
dren grow, privacy literacy’s objectives shift from helping
children understand the rationale behind rules to helping
them recognize what makes certain information flows
more appropriate than others. Applied to passwordman-
agement, this means that as children gain experience in
different social contexts, privacy literacy becomes less
about their knowing why they shouldn’t disclose a pass-
word (rule) and more about their ability to make deci-
sions about disclosing a password (norm).
5.2. Using Learning Moments to Strengthen Children’s
Privacy Literacy
One way to integrate privacy literacy into children’s
everyday lives could be through identifying learning
moments. Consider Family S, where a 5-year-old boy dis-
closed an iPad password to an interviewer even though
his mother had told him passwords should be guarded
like house keys. She could have presumed her son forgot
or didn’t understand her advice. Instead, she suggested
he might have trusted the interviewer. Rather than view-
ing her son’s behavior as wrong, she considered the situ-
ation from his perspective and recognized how he could
have perceived the information flow to be appropriate.
This kind of thinking can attune caregivers and edu-
cators toward opportunities for learning moments to dis-
cuss appropriate privacy behavior. One could imagine
the Family S parent asking her son why he disclosed the
password to the interviewer and the two collaboratively
generating scenarios when it would and would not be
appropriate to disclose passwords. Talking through sce-
narios in connection with examples from children’s lived
experience can concretize the abstract concept of norms
for children. Conversely, one could imagine a parent chid-
ing a child for breaking the ‘no telling passwords’ rule,
which also occurred in our interviews. Where attending
to norms can promote inquiry with children, enforcing
rules leaves little room for conversation.
This CI-based approach can also help adults consider
what types of privacy lessons will resonate with chil-
dren. For instance, some children did not express con-
cern at others viewing their Chromebook information.
The differing norms that govern the education and fam-
ily life contexts can explain why children might not ques-
tion those information flows. In addition, some school
password practices went against security best practices.
Thus, while school is an obvious place for children to
learn about privacy, such lessonsmight bemore effective
if they discuss privacy flows in non-education contexts.
In other words, a lesson on password security might res-
onate more if it uses the example of protecting a game
account rather than a school account. This also under-
scores the value of reinforcing privacy lessons across dif-
ferent social contexts (Kumar et al., 2019).
Grounding privacy literacy in appropriate norms does
not mean ceding responsibility for information flows to
children. Parentsmaywant to know a child’s password so
they do not have to reset a device if/when the child for-
gets it. Teachers may write student passwords on index
cards because helping children reset their passwords
if/when they forget them consumes valuable instruc-
tion time. Practices that seem to contradict general pri-
vacy and security advice make sense in context, par-
ticularly when considering children’s evolving cognitive,
social, and emotional development. Indeed, any attempt
to strengthen children’s privacy literacy must accommo-
date variations in children’s developmental capacities,
caregivers’ child-rearing approaches, educators’ peda-
gogical styles, policies of institutions like schools, affor-
dances of digital platforms, and privacy regulations per-
taining to children’s data. While recent work has begun
to develop privacy-related guidance for children of differ-
ent ages (Prior & Renaud, 2020), we believe CI offers a
means to address several of these variations because of
its commitment to norms over rules and its attendance
to privacy as the appropriate flow of information.
6. Conclusion
Drawing on discussions about children’s password man-
agement practices in 30 families, we offer a new
approach to privacy literacy grounded in CI (Nissenbaum,
2010, 2019). We recognize this type of privacy education
requires more effort than giving children a rule to follow,
and we encourage further participatory work with chil-
dren, caregivers, and educators to translate CI into age-
appropriate forms. But oversimplifying privacy as a prop-
erty of information (i.e., passwords are private) or reduc-
ing it to a set of black-and-white rules (i.e., don’t tell any-
one your password) does children a disservice because it
does not take into account their lived experiences with
information management. Framing privacy as a set of
rules centers children’s compliance rather than their skill
development. We argue for strengthening children’s pri-
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vacy literacy not in terms of teaching them rules but by
helping them enact appropriate information flows. The
latter will better equip them for the informationmanage-
ment tasks they will face as they get older.
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